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In the last decade, researchers have shown burgeoning interest in issues at the intersec-
tion of emotion and law. Given the longstanding interest in emotion among social (and 
other) psychologists, most of this research has come from a psychological perspective, but 
it also includes work with a legal, sociological, philosophical, and neuroscience flavor. 
The issues are theoretical as well as practical, influencing both psychological theories of 
emotion and matters of legal practice and policy. 
The law adopts a double standard in its treatment of emotion. In some areas, the law 
explicitly addresses emotion as a legitimate consideration, but in other areas, the law de-
nies emotion any role in legal decision making. For example, legal analysis requires de-
cision makers to consider the emotional reactions of others when classifying certain of-
fenses for purposes of criminal culpability (e.g., “hate crimes” and “crimes of passion”), 
awarding damages for emotional injuries (e.g., mental suffering and emotional distress), 
and allowing jurors’ moral judgments to influence certain consequential decisions such as 
punitive damages, capital sentencing, and jury nullification. At the same time, the courts 
make what may be untenable presumptions when they require factfinders to ignore their 
affective states and evaluate evidence, such as gory crime scene photographs, dispassion-
ately. Thus, the field of law and emotion is ripe for scholarly exploration. 
This Special Issue samples some of the ways in which emotion is relevant to legal is-
sues. The first two papers, by Terry Maroney and by Neil Feigenson and Jaihyun Park, lo-
cate the topic of emotion in legal judgment within a broader theoretical framework. Ma-
roney asks the question of whether law and emotion, as a distinct research field, deserves 
the status of other “law-and” movements, such as law-and-psychology, law-and-econom-
ics, etc. Drawing on scholarship in a number of disciplines (e.g., psychology, law, sociol-
ogy, and philosophy), she supports the academic status of law and emotion by present-
ing a descriptive taxonomy of this new field. In addition to organizing extant research on 
the topic, this taxonomy identifies gaps in the existing literature and suggests areas for fu-
ture research. 
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The paper by Feigenson and Park takes a somewhat narrower focus. It reviews re-
search on the role of emotion in a specific type of legal judgment, namely, attributions 
of responsibility and blame. These sorts of attributions, which occur in a variety of so-
cial situations, are especially relevant to legal decision making in the negligence context 
(Feigenson, 2000). Drawing on the extensive research on affect and social judgment, Fei-
genson and Park discuss the various ways in which emotions and moods can influence 
factfinders’ attributions of responsibility, and they propose a model that distinguishes 
among different types of affective influences. Their model effectively integrates and or-
ganizes prior research on emotion and attribution in the jury context, and it has clear im-
plications for conducting future research in the area. Importantly, they also consider legal 
decision makers’ ability to correct for affective influences in their reasoning—that might 
or might not be desirable from a normative perspective. An awareness of potential bias is 
often viewed as a necessary first step toward its elimination, but as a wealth of research 
has demonstrated, it is often not sufficient (Fischhoff, 1982). 
The next four papers are experimental studies that address the role of emotion in le-
gal factfinding. Horowitz, Kerr, Park, and Gockel ask whether informing jurors of their 
nullification power would focus the jury on emotional rather than evidentiary factors and 
thereby invite “chaos” into the courtroom. They find that emotionally biasing information 
(i.e., a sympathetic vs. an unsympathetic victim) has its greatest impact when nullification 
instructions are provided in a nullification-relevant case (i.e., euthanasia, as opposed to 
murder for profit). The results extend the authors’ prior work on jury nullification (Nie-
dermeier, Horowitz, & Kerr, 1999) by showing that one way nullification instructions 
may operate is by legitimizing emotions as valid information for jurors to use in reaching 
a verdict. Moreover, they show that nullification instructions may be problematic in some 
types of cases but not others. 
The study by Horowitz et al. explores the effect of emotionally biasing extra-legal in-
formation; Bright and Goodman-Delahunty, on the other hand, examine the effect of 
emotionally biasing evidence presented at trial. Although courts tend to assume that 
gruesome evidence will have a prejudicial effect on jurors’ verdicts, research testing this 
assumption has yielded mixed results (Bornstein & Nemeth, 1999). Bright and Goodman-
Delahunty shed some light on these inconsistent findings by showing that gruesome pho-
tographic evidence exerts a stronger effect than gruesome verbal testimony, and that the 
influence of the gruesome photographs is mediated by mock jurors’ anger response. 
The next two papers examine how observers’ expectations of victims’ conduct influence 
the way in which legal actors perceive them. Victims’ reactions to crime, especially their 
emotional responses, can influence a variety of legally relevant judgments. For example, if a 
victim appears untroubled by a set of injurious events, authorities might be less convinced 
that a crime has actually taken place, making police less likely to investigate and prosecu-
tors less likely to file charges. Furthermore, victims’ emotional reactions, both at the time of 
the crime and while testifying, can affect their credibility at trial. Rose, Nadler, and Clark ex-
plore these issues within the context of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase 
of a criminal trial, by crossing a crime victim’s emotional reaction (severe vs. mild) with the 
seriousness of the crime (e.g., armed robbery vs. pickpocketing). They find that there is not 
a simple effect of emotion in this context, but rather that people expect victims to match 
the intensity of their emotional response to the seriousness of the event (i.e., they adhere to 
a proportionality rule in evaluating victims’ credibility). Interestingly, they report that al-
though a victim’s emotional response affects various measures of how mock jurors perceive 
the victim, it does not affect their recommended punishment for the defendant. 
The following paper by Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, and Magnussen shows that these 
effects are not inevitable. Like Rose et al., they manipulate a crime victim’s emotional re-
sponse, here for an alleged acquaintance rape. Previous research (Kaufmann, Drevland, 
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Wessel, Overskeid, & Magnussen, 2003) had found that, similar to the findings of the 
Rose et al. study, rape victims who display a proportional and congruent emotional re-
sponse (i.e., who are demonstrably upset) while talking about the event are more cred-
ible than victims who display incongruent emotion (i.e., who are positive and relaxed). 
However, in this study, a sample of Norwegian judges was not affected by the victim’s 
emotional response. Thus, factfinders’ training and experience may be capable of offset-
ting the unwanted effects of victims’ emotional reactions. This finding begs the question 
of whether a victim’s emotional reaction should influence legal decision making. Is a very 
upset victim more likely to be telling the truth than a stoic victim? Should punishment be 
greater when the crime has engendered more severe emotional consequences? With re-
spect to the first question, a speaker’s emotional demeanor can be a reliable cue to his or 
her veracity (Vrij, 2000); whereas with regard to the second question, the mere admissibil-
ity of victim impact evidence suggests that courts do view a crime’s emotional impact as a 
legitimate consideration in sentencing (Greene, 1999). 
The Special Issue concludes with a paper by Wiener, Bornstein, and Voss, which draws 
on research in social and cognitive psychology to show how theories of judgment and de-
cision making that incorporate decision makers’ affective responses apply to various legal 
contexts. It takes two widely used models of decision making, the rational actor and lens 
models, and illustrates their utility for understanding legal judgments by using them to 
interpret existing research findings in the areas of juror decision making, people’s obedi-
ence to the law (e.g., paying taxes), and eyewitness memory. 
Although the present set of papers makes a valuable contribution to the study of emo-
tion in legal judgment, the work represented here also makes apparent that psycholegal 
researchers have merely scratched the surface of this vibrant field. As the reviews by Ma-
roney, Feigenson, and Park, and Wiener et al. make all too clear, this Special Issue rep-
resents only a small fraction of the research possibilities at the intersection of law and 
emotion. For example, emotion is of paramount importance in addressing issues such as 
the effects of stress on eyewitness memory (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 
2004), the causes and consequences of hate crimes (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002), 
a number of clinical-forensic issues, such as emotional disorders in criminal populations 
(e.g., psychopathy; see Hare, 1996), and the assessment.of emotional injuries in civil liti-
gation (Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, 1995). And this is by no means an exhaustive list. 
As Editors of this Special Issue, we find it encouraging that so many scholars, from di-
verse fields, are beginning to turn their attention to the role of emotion in legal decision 
making; and at the same time, we are excited by the many challenging questions that re-
searchers have not yet begun to address. 
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